



Optimising masking costs of CAESAR candidates

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Masking

- Countermeasure against side-channel analysis
- Arithmetic vs. Boolean
- Costs factor 2–8 in terms of cycles [Mes01]
- Costs grow quadratically for nonlinear gates, e.g.:


$$\begin{aligned}
 z = x \wedge y &\quad \rightarrow \quad [x' = x \oplus x_m] \\
 &\quad \quad \quad [y' = y \oplus y_m] \\
 &\quad \quad \quad z' = x' \wedge y' \\
 &\quad \quad \quad z_m = (x_m \wedge y') \oplus (y_m \wedge x') \oplus (x_m \wedge y_m)
 \end{aligned}$$





Goal


- How can the costs of applying masking countermeasures to ciphers be reduced?





Goal

- How can the costs of applying masking countermeasures to ciphers be reduced?
 - By reducing nonlinear operations?
 - By design?



Context – CAESAR competition

ACORN	++AE	AEGIS	AES-CMCC	AES-COBRA
AES-COPA	AES-CPFB	AES-JAMBU	AES-OTR	AEZ
Artemia	Ascon	AVALANCHE	Calico	CBA
CBEAM	CLOC	Deoxys	ELmD	Enchilada
FASER	HKC	HS1-SIV	ICEPOLE	iFeed[AES]
Joltik	Julius	Ketje	Keyak	KIASU
LAC	Marble	McMambo	Minalpher	MORUS
NORX	OCB	OMD	PAEQ	PAES
PANDA	π -Cipher	POET	POLAWIS	PRIMATEs
Prøst	Raviyoyla	Sablier	SCREAM	SHELL
SILC	Silver	STRIBOB	Tiaoxin	TrivIA-ck
Wheesht	YAES			

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Context – CAESAR competition

(S-boxes of)

8x8	5x5	4x4
AES	Ascon	Joltik
AES ⁻¹	ICEPOLE	Joltik ⁻¹
iSCREAM	Ketje/Keyak	LAC
SCREAM	PRIMATE	Minalpher
SCREAM ⁻¹	PRIMATE ⁻¹	Prøst
		RECTANGLE
		RECTANGLE ⁻¹





Optimising masking costs


Nonlinear operations





Multiplicative complexity (MC)


- Most nonlinear operations in the nonlinear part of the primitive: the S-box





Multiplicative complexity (MC)


- Most nonlinear operations in the nonlinear part of the primitive: the S-box
- MC: minimal number of AND/OR gates required to implement function





Multiplicative complexity (MC)


- Most nonlinear operations in the nonlinear part of the primitive: the S-box
- MC: minimal number of AND/OR gates required to implement function
- Goal is to compute the MC of CAESAR S-boxes





Minimizing AND/OR gates

- Existing logic synthesis tools not very helpful
 - E.g. Espresso, SIS, misII, Logic Friday, ABC, ...
- Instead: convert to SAT and let SAT solvers do the work
- Converting problem to SAT nontrivial, but feasible [CHM11, Mou15]





Reducing decisional MC to SAT

$$q_0 = a_0 + a_1 \cdot x_0 + a_2 \cdot x_1 + a_3 \cdot x_2 + a_4 \cdot x_3$$

$$q_1 = a_5 + a_6 \cdot x_0 + a_7 \cdot x_1 + a_8 \cdot x_2 + a_9 \cdot x_3$$

$$t_0 = q_0 \cdot q_1$$

$$q_2 = a_{10} + a_{11} \cdot x_0 + a_{12} \cdot x_1 + a_{13} \cdot x_2 + a_{14} \cdot x_3 + a_{15} \cdot t_0$$

$$q_3 = a_{16} + a_{17} \cdot x_0 + a_{18} \cdot x_1 + a_{19} \cdot x_2 + a_{20} \cdot x_3 + a_{21} \cdot t_0$$

$$t_1 = q_2 \cdot q_3$$

$$q_4 = a_{22} + a_{23} \cdot x_0 + a_{24} \cdot x_1 + a_{25} \cdot x_2 + a_{26} \cdot x_3 + a_{27} \cdot t_0 + a_{28} \cdot t_1$$

$$q_5 = a_{29} + a_{30} \cdot x_0 + a_{31} \cdot x_1 + a_{32} \cdot x_2 + a_{33} \cdot x_3 + a_{34} \cdot t_0 + a_{35} \cdot t_1$$

$$t_2 = q_4 \cdot q_5$$

$$y_0 = a_{36}x_0 + a_{37} \cdot x_1 + a_{38} \cdot x_2 + a_{39} \cdot x_3 + a_{40} \cdot t_0 + a_{41} \cdot t_1 + a_{42} \cdot t_2$$

$$y_1 = a_{43}x_0 + a_{44} \cdot x_1 + a_{45} \cdot x_2 + a_{46} \cdot x_3 + a_{47} \cdot t_0 + a_{48} \cdot t_1 + a_{49} \cdot t_2$$


$$y_2 = a_{50}x_0 + a_{51} \cdot x_1 + a_{52} \cdot x_2 + a_{53} \cdot x_3 + a_{54} \cdot t_0 + a_{55} \cdot t_1 + a_{56} \cdot t_2$$

$$y_3 = a_{57}x_0 + a_{58} \cdot x_1 + a_{59} \cdot x_2 + a_{60} \cdot x_3 + a_{61} \cdot t_0 + a_{62} \cdot t_1 + a_{63} \cdot t_2$$



Our work

- Generate logic formulas in ANF for given S-box and MC
- Convert ANF to CNF
- Let MiniSAT, CryptoMiniSAT, Plingeling, Treengeling do the work on big machine
- Translate back to S-box implementation





Results

S-box	MC	S-box	MC
AES	≤ 32 [BP10]	PRIMATE ⁻¹	$\in \{6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}^*$
AES ⁻¹	≤ 32 [BP10]	Joltik	4
iSCREAM	≤ 12 [GLSV14]	Joltik ⁻¹	4*
SCREAM	≤ 12 [GLS ⁺ 15]	LAC	4*
SCREAM ⁻¹	≤ 12 [GLS ⁺ 15]	Minalpher	5*
Ascon	5	Prøst	4
ICEPOLE	6*	RECTANGLE	4
Ketje/Keyak	5	RECTANGLE ⁻¹	4*
PRIMATE	$\in \{6, 7\}^*$		



Intermezzo – bitslice gate complexity

- Minimal number of AND/OR/XOR/NOT operations
- Largely been done for 4x4 S-boxes [UDCI⁺11]
- Provably optimal bitsliced implementations using provably minimal nonlinear operations





Intermezzo – work in progress...

S-box	BGC	Mine	Authors
Ascon			5 AND, 11 XOR, 6 NOT
ICEPOLE			
Ketje/Keyak	≤ 15	5 AND, 5 XOR, 5 NOT	5 AND, 5 XOR, 5 NOT
PRIMATE		6 AND, 1 OR, 37 XOR, 3 NOT	
PRIMATE ⁻¹			
Joltik	11	4 OR, 4 XOR, 3 NOT	4 NOR, 3 XOR, 1 XNOR
Joltik ⁻¹	11	4 OR, 4 XOR, 3 NOT	
LAC	13	2 AND, 2 OR, 6 XOR, 3 NOT	
Minalpher			
Prøst			4 AND, 4 XOR
RECTANGLE	≤ 12	2 AND, 2 OR, 7 XOR, 1 NOT	1 AND, 3 OR, 7 XOR, 1 NOT
RECTANGLE ⁻¹			

Disclaimer: not optimal in number of NOT



Intermezzo – Joltik

① $y_0 = x_0 | x_1$

② $t_0 = \neg x_3$

③ $y_0 = y_0 \oplus t_0$

④ $t_0 = x_1 | x_2$

⑤ $t_0 = \neg t_0$

⑥ $y_1 = x_0 \oplus t_0$


⑦ $t_0 = y_0 | y_1$

⑧ $t_0 = \neg t_0$

⑨ $y_3 = t_0 \oplus x_2$

⑩ $t_0 = x_2 | y_0$

⑪ $y_2 = t_0 \oplus x_1$





Intermezzo – Joltik⁻¹

① $y_2 = x_0 | x_1$

② $t_0 = \neg x_3$

③ $y_2 = y_2 \oplus t_0$

④ $t_0 = x_0 | y_2$

⑤ $y_1 = t_0 \oplus x_2$

⑥ $t_0 = y_1 | y_2$

⑦ $t_0 = \neg t_0$

⑧ $y_0 = t_0 \oplus x_1$

⑨ $t_0 = y_0 | y_1$

⑩ $t_0 = \neg t_0$

⑪ $y_3 = t_0 \oplus x_0$



Intermezzo – LAC

① $t_0 = \neg x_1$

② $t_1 = t_0 | x_0$

③ $t_1 = x_2 \oplus t_1$

④ $t_2 = x_0 \oplus x_3$

⑤ $t_3 = \neg t_2$

⑥ $t_2 = t_3 | t_1$

⑦ $y_3 = t_3 \oplus t_1$

⑧ $y_0 = x_0 \oplus t_2$


⑨ $t_2 = t_0 \& y_3$

⑩ $y_2 = t_1 \oplus t_2$

⑪ $t_2 = \neg x_0$

⑫ $t_2 = t_2 \& y_2$

⑬ $y_1 = x_1 \oplus t_2$





Optimising masking costs

Comparing designs





High-level operations

- Table lookups
- Bitwise Boolean functions
- Shifts and rotates
- Modular addition/multiplication
- Modular polynomial multiplication





Results

Operation	Table lookups	Bitwise Boolean	Shifts/rotates	Mod. add. and mult.	Mod. poly. mult.
AES	256 bytes	XOR	Fixed		✓
AES tables	4096 bytes	XOR	Fixed		
AES bitsliced		AND,OR,XOR	Fixed		✓
iSCREAM	512 bytes	AND,OR,XOR	Fixed	× mod 256	
SCREAM	512 bytes	AND,OR,XOR		× mod 256	
Ascon		AND,OR,XOR	Fixed		
ICEPOLE	96 bytes	AND,XOR	Fixed		
Ketje/Keyak		AND,XOR	Fixed		
PRIMATE	25 bytes	XOR	Fixed		✓
Joltik	64 bytes	XOR	Fixed	+ mod 16	✓
LAC	16 bytes	XOR	Fixed		
Minalpher	16 bytes	XOR			
Prøst		AND,XOR	Fixed		
RECTANGLE		AND,OR,XOR	Fixed		



Results

- Expected masking costs less high than in [Mes01]
- Ascon, Ketje, Keyak, LAC, Minalpher, Prøst, and RECTANGLE stand out (at the moment)
- Designers/implementers should use operations that are cheap to mask under a Boolean scheme



Conclusions

- For 4- and 5-bit S-boxes, we can find an implementation with a provably minimum number of AND/OR operations





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- Same technique can be used to find provably minimal bitsliced implementations





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- Designers and implementers should take masking costs into consideration

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- For 4- and 5-bit S-boxes, we can find an implementation with a provably minimum number of AND/OR operations
- Same technique can be used to find provably minimal bitsliced implementations
- Designers and implementers should take masking costs into consideration
 - CAESAR committee as well
 - Benchmarking possibilities?



Questions

Thank you for your attention

Questions?



References I



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