# Mixing Layers in Symmetric Crypto






## Joint work with...

Thorsten Kranz, Gregor Leander, Ko Stoffelen, Friedrich Wiemer. Shorter Linear Straight-Line Programs for MDS Matrices. *ToSC 2017 Issue 4.* 

Ko Stoffelen, Joan Daemen. Column Parity Mixers. ToSC 2018 Issue 1.




## Diffusion





## **Diffusion in AES**





## **Diffusion in AES**

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{bmatrix}$$



• Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes



- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"



- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"
- Given [n, k, d] code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , best error correction when d = n k + 1



- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"
- Given [n, k, d] code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , best error correction when d = n k + 1
- For example, Reed-Solomon codes (DVD, Blu-ray)



- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"
- Given [n, k, d] code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , best error correction when d = n k + 1
- For example, Reed-Solomon codes (DVD, Blu-ray)
- Use this idea for diffusion in crypto!

- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"
- Given [n, k, d] code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , best error correction when d = n k + 1
- For example, Reed-Solomon codes (DVD, Blu-ray)
- Use this idea for diffusion in crypto!
- An  $m \times n$  matrix A over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is MDS when the set  $\{(x_1, \ldots, x_n, (Ax)_1, \ldots, (Ax)_m) | x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n\}$  forms an MDS code



- Coding theory has maximum distance separable (MDS) codes
- "Reaches Singleton bound"
- Given [n, k, d] code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , best error correction when d = n k + 1
- For example, Reed-Solomon codes (DVD, Blu-ray)
- Use this idea for diffusion in crypto!
- An  $m \times n$  matrix A over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is MDS when the set  $\{(x_1, \ldots, x_n, (Ax)_1, \ldots, (Ax)_m) | x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n\}$  forms an MDS code
- MixColumns matrix is MDS



#### Lightweight Multiplication in $GF(2^n)$ with Applications to MDS Matrices

Christof Beierle<sup>(⊠)</sup>, Thorsten Kranz, and Gregor Leander

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany {christof.beierle,thorsten.kranz,gregor.leander}@rub.de

Abstract. In this paper we consider the fundamental question of optimizing finite field multiplications with one fixed element. Surprisingly,



#### Lightweight Multiplication in $GF(2^n)$ with Applications to MDS Matrices

Christof Beierle<sup>(⊠)</sup>, Thorsten Kranz, and Gregor Leander

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany {christof.beierle,thorsten.kranz greger leanderlärub de

#### Optimizing Implementations of Lightweight Building Blocks

Abstract. In this paper we consider the mizing finite field multiplications with o

Jérémy Jean<sup>1</sup>, Thomas Peyrin<sup>2</sup>, Siang Meng Sim<sup>2</sup> and Jade Tourteaux<sup>1,3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ANSSI Crypto Lab, Paris, France Jeremy.Jean@ssi.gouv.fr

<sup>2</sup> Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Thomas.Peyrin@ntu.edu.sg, ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg

> <sup>3</sup> Paris Diderot University, Paris, France Jade.Tourteaux@gmail.com

Abstract. We study the synthesis of small functions used as building blocks in lightweight cryptographic designs in terms of hardware implementations. This phase



#### Lightweight Multiplication in $GF(2^n)$ with Applications to MDS Matrices

Christof Beierle<sup>(⊠)</sup>, Thorsten Kranz, and Gregor Leander

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany {christof.beierle,thorsten.kranz gregor leanderlarub de

#### **Ontimizing Implementations** Lightweight MDS Generalized Circulant Matrices

### Building Blocks

Meicheng Liu<sup>1,2</sup><sup>(⊠)</sup> and Siang Meng Sim<sup>1</sup><sup>(⊠)</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg <sup>2</sup> State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, People's Republic of China meicheng.liu@gmail.com

ung Meng Sim<sup>2</sup> and Jade Tourteaux<sup>1,3</sup>

) Lab. Paris. France n@ssi.gouv.fr

ical University, Singapore .sg.ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg

iversity, Paris, France saux@gmail.com

small functions used as building blocks in ns of hardware implementations. This phase

Abstract. In this article, we analyze the circulant structure of generalized circulant matrices to reduce the search space for finding lightweight



#### Lightweight Multir with Applications

Christof Beierle<sup>(⊠)</sup>, Thorsten

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruh {christof.beierle,thorsten.}

#### Lightweight MDS M

#### On the Construction of Lightweight Circulant Involutory MDS Matrices

Yongqiang Li<sup>1,2</sup><sup>(E3)</sup> and Mingsheng Wang<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> State Key Laboratory of Information Security. Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China vongg,lee@gmail.com,wangmingsheng@iie.ac.cn <sup>2</sup> Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory. Chengdu, China

.3

Abstract. In the present paper, we investigate the problem of con-Meicheng Liu<sup>1,2</sup>(⊠) structing MDS matrices with as few bit XOR operations as possible. ical University, Singapore <sup>1</sup> Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore .sg.ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg iversity, Paris, France <sup>2</sup> State Key Laboratory of Information Security, saux@gmail.com Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, People's Republic of China meicheng.liu@gmail.com small functions used as building blocks in

ns of hardware implementations. This phase

Abstract. In this article, we analyze the circulant structure of generalized circulant matrices to reduce the search space for finding lightweight





#### Lightweight Multi<sub>r</sub> with Applications On the Construction of Lightweight Circulant Involutory MDS Matrices

Christof Beierle<sup>(⊠)</sup>, Thorsten

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruh

Yongqiang  $\mathrm{Li}^{1,2(\boxtimes)}$  and Mingsheng  $\mathrm{Wang}^1$ 

#### Lightweight MDS Involution Matrices

Siang Meng $\mathrm{Sim}^{1(\boxtimes)},$  Khoong<br/>ming Khoo², Frédérique Oggier¹, and Thomas Peyrin¹

<sup>1</sup> Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg, {frederique,thomas.peyrin}@ntu.edu.sg <sup>2</sup> DSO National Laboratories, Singapore, Singapore kkhoongm@dso.org.sg

Abstract. In this article, we provide new methods to look for lightweight MDS matrices, and in particular involutory ones. By proving many new mean time and equipance alonge for mainer MDS works

Abstract. In this article, we analyze the circulant structure of generalized circulant matrices to reduce the search space for finding lightweight Information Security, , Chinese Academy of Sciences, 'hina mingsheng@iie.ac.cn umication Security Laboratory, China

,3

investigate the problem of conbit XOR operations as possible. ical University, Singapore .sg, ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg

niversity, Paris, France saux@gmail.com

small functions used as building blocks in ns of hardware implementations. This phase



7/16



#### Lightweight Multi<sub>I</sub> with Applications

#### <sup>hi</sup>F On the Construction of Lightweight Circulant <sup>15</sup> Involutory MDS Matrices

Christof Beierle<sup>( $\boxtimes$ )</sup>, Thorsten

Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruh

Yongqiang  $\mathrm{Li}^{1,2(\boxtimes)}$  and Mingsheng Wang^1

Information Security, , Chinese Academy of Sciences,

Lightweight MDS Involution Matrices

#### Lightweight Diffusion Layer: Importance of Toeplitz Matrices

Siang Meng  $\operatorname{Sim}^{1(\boxtimes)}$ , Khoont and The

<sup>1</sup> Nanyang Technological U ssim011@e.ntu.edu.sg, {fred <sup>2</sup> DSO National Labora kkhoong Sumanta Sarkar<sup>1</sup> and Habeeb Syed<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> TCS Innovation Labs, Hyderabad, INDIA, Sumanta.Sarkar1@tcs.com <sup>2</sup> TCS Innovation Labs, Hyderabad, INDIA, Habeeb.Syed@tcs.com

Abstract. In this article, we provide the state of the st

Abstract. In this article, we analyze the circulant structure of generalized circulant matrices to reduce the search space for finding lightweight



.3



• Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$
- Assumes 'summation' has constant cost, local optimization



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$
- Assumes 'summation' has constant cost, local optimization
- Core idea: an n × n matrix over 𝔽<sub>2<sup>k</sup></sub> can be viewed as nk × nk matrix over 𝔽<sub>2</sub>, do global optimization



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$
- Assumes 'summation' has constant cost, local optimization
- Core idea: an n × n matrix over 𝔽<sub>2<sup>k</sup></sub> can be viewed as nk × nk matrix over 𝔽<sub>2</sub>, do global optimization
- Solving the shortest linear straight-line program (SLP) problem yields the optimal number of XORs



- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$
- Assumes 'summation' has constant cost, local optimization
- Core idea: an n × n matrix over 𝔽<sub>2<sup>k</sup></sub> can be viewed as nk × nk matrix over 𝔽<sub>2</sub>, do global optimization
- Solving the shortest linear straight-line program (SLP) problem yields the optimal number of XORs
- Well-studied problem, known algorithms give better results





- Cauchy and Vandermonde matrices are MDS, but don't exist for all parameters
- Add structure to reduce search space (Hadamard, circulant, Toeplitz, subfield)
- Have to test for MDS-ness, but the probability is higher than for a random matrix
- XOR count of a: number of XORs to multiply a with an arbitrary b,  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^k}$
- Assumes 'summation' has constant cost, local optimization
- Core idea: an n × n matrix over 𝔽<sub>2<sup>k</sup></sub> can be viewed as nk × nk matrix over 𝔽<sub>2</sub>, do global optimization
- Solving the shortest linear straight-line program (SLP) problem yields the optimal number of XORs
- Well-studied problem, known algorithms give better results
- Remove common subexpressions, allow cancellation



1	1	0	0	$x_0$		$x_0 \oplus x_1$	
1	1	1	0	$x_1$	$\Rightarrow$	$x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2$	l
1	1	1	1	<i>x</i> <sub>2</sub>		$x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$	ĺ
0	1	1	1	x <sub>3</sub>		$x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$	



$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} x_0 \oplus x_1 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \end{cases}$$

 $v_0 := x_0 \oplus x_1$ 



$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} x_0 \oplus x_1 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \end{cases}$$

$$v_0 := x_0 \oplus x_1$$
$$v_1 := v_0 \oplus x_2$$



$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} x_0 \oplus x_1 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \end{cases}$$

$$v_0 := x_0 \oplus x_1$$
$$v_1 := v_0 \oplus x_2$$
$$v_2 := v_1 \oplus x_3$$



$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{cases} x_0 \oplus x_1 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\ x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \end{cases}$$

$$v_0 := x_0 \oplus x_1$$
$$v_1 := v_0 \oplus x_2$$
$$v_2 := v_1 \oplus x_3$$
$$v_3 := v_2 \oplus x_0$$



• Good diffusion over a few rounds is more important




- Good diffusion over a few rounds is more important
- MDS requirement can be dropped when there are good bounds on trails (attacks)



- Good diffusion over a few rounds is more important
- MDS requirement can be dropped when there are good bounds on trails (attacks)
- PRIDE uses a *near-MDS* matrix, with a few more zeroes



- Good diffusion over a few rounds is more important
- MDS requirement can be dropped when there are good bounds on trails (attacks)
- PRIDE uses a *near-MDS* matrix, with a few more zeroes
- KECCAK-f uses a column parity mixer (CPM)





$$\theta(A) = A + f(A)$$



$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^{\mathsf{T}} A$$



$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^{\mathsf{T}} A Z$$



$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m \mathbf{1}_m^{\mathsf{T}} A Z$$



$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^m A Z$$



For an  $m \times n$  matrix A:

$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^m A Z$$

 $\theta$  fully defined by m and Z



For an  $m \times n$  matrix A:

$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^m A Z$$

 $\boldsymbol{\theta}$  fully defined by  $\boldsymbol{m}$  and  $\boldsymbol{Z}$ 

Some algebraic properties:



For an  $m \times n$  matrix A:

$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^m A Z$$

 $\boldsymbol{\theta}$  fully defined by  $\boldsymbol{m}$  and  $\boldsymbol{Z}$ 

Some algebraic properties:

• If *m* even, CPMs are involutions (as  $(\mathbf{1}_m^m)^2 = \mathbf{0}$ ), commutative,  $\cong (\mathbb{Z}_2^{n^2}, +)$ 





For an  $m \times n$  matrix A:

$$\theta(A) = A + \mathbf{1}_m^m A Z$$

 $\boldsymbol{\theta}$  fully defined by  $\boldsymbol{m}$  and  $\boldsymbol{Z}$ 


Some algebraic properties:

- If *m* even, CPMs are involutions (as  $(\mathbf{1}_m^m)^2 = \mathbf{0}$ ), commutative,  $\cong (\mathbb{Z}_2^{n^2}, +)$
- If *m* odd, CPMs invertible iff Z + I is invertible, non-commutative,  $\cong GL(n,2)$  if Z + I non-singular



# Differential cryptanalysis in a nutshell

• If  $\Pr[\Delta_0, \dots, \Delta_r]$  is high, cipher is not random








# Differential cryptanalysis in a nutshell


- If  $\Pr[\Delta_0, \dots, \Delta_r]$  is high, cipher is not random
- Leads to key recovery!





# Differential cryptanalysis in a nutshell

- If  $\Pr[\Delta_0, \dots, \Delta_r]$  is high, cipher is not random
- Leads to key recovery!
- Many variants exist





• Goal: no low-weight differential trail



- Goal: no low-weight differential trail
- How about a state like this?




- Goal: no low-weight differential trail
- How about a state like this?
- CPM-kernel issues can be avoided by some transposition (ShiftRows-like)



- Goal: no low-weight differential trail
- How about a state like this?

	about a otato													

- CPM-kernel issues can be avoided by some transposition (ShiftRows-like)
- How about this one?





1. Determine design goals



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z
- 8. Pick 'good' round constants to beat all kinds of invariant attacks



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z
- 8. Pick 'good' round constants to beat all kinds of invariant attacks
- 9. Do more analysis



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z
- 8. Pick 'good' round constants to beat all kinds of invariant attacks
- 9. Do more analysis
- 10. Determine the number of rounds



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z
- 8. Pick 'good' round constants to beat all kinds of invariant attacks
- 9. Do more analysis
- 10. Determine the number of rounds
- 11. Implement it



- 1. Determine design goals
- 2. Pick m, n, and cell width
- 3. Pick 'good' 'efficient' non-linear S-box
- 4. Consider (truncated) trails in the kernel (independent of Z)
- 5. Determine 'good' transposition
- 6. Consider (truncated) trails outside the kernel
- 7. Determine 'good' Z
- 8. Pick 'good' round constants to beat all kinds of invariant attacks
- 9. Do more analysis
- 10. Determine the number of rounds
- 11. Implement it

14/16

12. Give it a name



• 16 rounds  $(\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma)$ ,  $4 \times 16 \times 4 = 256$  bits permutation



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ),  $4 \times 16 \times 4 = 256$  bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0a_2 + a_1a_2 + a_1a_2a_3$



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0a_2 + a_1a_2 + a_1a_2a_3$
- $\theta$ : Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- $\theta$ : Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- $\theta$ : Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by  $\{14, 3, 10, 0\}$



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row
- SAC after 3 rounds, full diffusion after 5



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row
- SAC after 3 rounds, full diffusion after 5
- In the kernel:  $\geq$  52 active cells after 4 rounds





- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0a_2 + a_1a_2 + a_1a_2a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row
- SAC after 3 rounds, full diffusion after 5
- In the kernel:  $\geq$  52 active cells after 4 rounds
- Outside the kernel:  $\geq$  46 active cells after 4 rounds (differential), DP  $2^{-92}$



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0 a_2 + a_1 a_2 + a_1 a_2 a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row
- SAC after 3 rounds, full diffusion after 5
- In the kernel:  $\geq$  52 active cells after 4 rounds
- Outside the kernel:  $\geq$  46 active cells after 4 rounds (differential), DP  $2^{-92}$
- Outside the kernel:  $\geq$  40 active cells after 4 rounds (linear), LP 2<sup>-80</sup>



- 16 rounds ( $\iota \circ \rho \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \gamma$ ), 4 × 16 × 4 = 256 bits permutation
- $\gamma$ : rotational symmetric,  $b_0 = a_1 + a_2 + a_0a_2 + a_1a_2 + a_1a_2a_3$
- θ: Z is circulant, first row [0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ..., 0]
- $\pi$ : rotate rows down
- $\rho$ : rotate rows cell-wise to the right by {14, 3, 10, 0}
- $\iota$ : add 0xF3485763  $\gg i$  in round *i* to even cells of top row
- SAC after 3 rounds, full diffusion after 5
- In the kernel:  $\geq$  52 active cells after 4 rounds
- Outside the kernel:  $\geq$  46 active cells after 4 rounds (differential), DP  $2^{-92}$
- Outside the kernel:  $\geq$  40 active cells after 4 rounds (linear), LP 2<sup>-80</sup>
- 36.69 cyc/byte on ARM Cortex-M3/M4



#### Thanks...

... for your attention

